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By Sebastian Rand 
 
At the center of Sally Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant is an innovative interpretation of Hegel’s 
charge that Kantian concepts are “empty”. According to Sedgwick, Hegel takes Kant’s famous 
dictum that “thoughts without content are empty” to reveal more about the master’s views than the 
master intended or could himself see. Hegel takes “thoughts” here to mean, first and foremost, 
concepts, and these he takes to be not only empty in the “official” Kantian sense—according to 
which they are “discursive” and thus “fulfill their function as forms of knowing […] only when 
applied to a sense content that is independently given” (p. 138)—but also empty in another, deeper 
sense: they are, in Sedgwick’s terms, “‘external’, or on the ‘other side’ of content” (p. 138). In other 
words, concepts are always and everywhere per se “without” intuitions. Sedgwick describes this 
deeper emptiness as follows: 
As independent from common reality, our concepts are taken to owe nothing of their nature and 
origin to objects known, to the process of knowing, to the relation of the knower to what is known. 
They are “external” in that they are presumed to have a fixed and already-given nature. Although 
there is progress in human knowledge, this progress is not taken to affect the thought-forms 
themselves. Nor do these thought-forms, if truly external, bear any responsibility for the progress of 
inquiry. (p. 138) 
As this passage suggests—and as many others in her book confirm—Sedgwick thinks that Hegel’s 
innovation beyond Kant consists in providing an alternative story about how our concepts do, in fact, 
owe a great deal of their nature and origin to the concepts known, to the process of knowing, and to 
the relation of the knower to what is known. Hegel’s views here, she says, reveal to us his “new 
account of conceptual form” (p. 125). Sedgwick, it seems to me, is right in all of this, and her careful 
development of the Hegelian criticism of Kant’s theoretical philosophy makes available wholly new 
and helpful ways of seeing the relation between these philosophers. But I will admit that she says 
quite a bit less on the positive side about Hegel’s account of conceptual form than I was hoping to 
read, given the powerful reconstruction of his criticism she provides. Of course, her book is 
entitled Hegel’s Critique of Kant, not Hegel’s Positive Doctrine in its Relation to Kant’s Philosophy, 
and in that sense my complaint is misplaced. But I suspect that at least some of Sedgwick’s 
unwillingness to say more about this new account of conceptual form is due to the way one part of 
her reading of Kant misses Hegel’s own reading, and thus obscures the Kantian resources he exploits 
in developing that new account. 
Sedgwick’s reading is deeply engaged with the major tendencies and problems in recent Hegel and 
Kant scholarship, particularly the attack on nonconceptual content. Her contribution here is a 
thoroughly convincing demonstration that for Hegel—and here Hegel was surely right—there is no 
nonconceptual content, but neither is there any noncontentful form. Hegel’s new account of 
conceptual form, then, should be an account of this essentially contentful form, a point Sally makes 
by highlighting Hegel’s low estimation of our powers of abstraction. But while questions in the 
philosophy of mind—questions about the role of intuition, about powers of abstraction, and so on—
surely play a large role in Hegel’s critique of Kant, they are not the whole story; there are questions, 
too, about formal, rather than transcendental, logic on both the Hegelian and Kantian sides. The two 
are not the same; otherwise put, Kant’s famous claim that “thoughts without content are empty”—
itself verging on an empty tautology—is not quite equivalent to the similar-looking claim that 
concepts without intuitions are empty. The claim that thoughts without content are empty is crucially 
a more general claim than the substitute sometimes offered in its place, namely, that concepts without 
intuitions are empty. The problem of thought and its content has both a ‘merely’ logical aspect and a 
transcendental-psychological aspect. These aspects are not, however, two entirely isomorphic sides 
of one issue, for if I am right, by separating out these issues we can see a way in which the logical 
issue—one Hegel takes up in his interpretation of Kant’s treatment of the universal/particular relation 
in the third Critique—is perhaps deeper, or at least broader, than the transcendental issue—one about 
the concept/intuition relation as addressed primarily in the Transcendental Deduction of the 
first Critique. 
In order to get a fully satisfactory picture of what Hegel is proposing with regard to conceptual form, 
we will need to add to Sally’s account a story about the deep systematic contribution made by 
Hegel’s transformative appropriation of Kant’s formal logic. Although I don’t have the time here to 
say anything concrete about what that might mean, I can offer the following vague hint: taking the 
logical points seriously means seeing Hegel’s own faculty-psychology in the Philosophy of Spirit as 
quite severely limiting the epistemic significance of our representational activities. 
Particularity and singularity 
Most basically, my claim is that we should not conflate the problem Hegel sees in Kant’s version of 
the universal/particular relation with the problem he sees in Kant’s version of the concept/intuition 
relation. My further claim is that Sedgwick’s presentation in her book is complicit in such a 
conflation. A primary culprit here is a common English philosophical usage of the term ‘particular’, 
in which one understands by this term something in the manner of a particle—one uses the word 
‘particular’ to refer to a single distinct bit. This usage appears in the secondary literature on German 
idealism, and in Sedgwick’s book, in such phrases as ‘sensible particular’, which have effectively no 
analogues in Kant or in Hegel.[1] When Kant elaborates his doctrine concerning intuitions, he does 
not characterise them logically as particular in form, but as singular, and he contrasts their logical 
singularity with the logical universality or generality of concepts. Indeed, particularity plays no role 
in the concept/intuition distinction at all; Kant invokes particularity only when he wants to talk about 
the relative generality of two universals, one of which ‘stands under’ the other. In such instances, the 
(so to speak) more universal universal—the genus—gets to keep the name ‘universal’, and the less 
universal universal—the species—is called the ‘particular’. My first step, then, is to point out that 
particularity does not, for Kant or Hegel, designate singularity, or particle-like-ness—the 
separateness of the isolated bit—but rather designates a limited universality explicitly conceived as 
subordinated to another, higher, more general universality. 
Thus in very broad terms, my point about the possibly conflated distinction here can now be put in 
more precise Kantian terms: the issues surrounding the concept/intuition relation are transcendental-
psychological issues about the relation of a representation that is universal in form to a representation 
that is singular in form, while the issues surrounding the universal/particular relation are logical 
issues about the relation of two things that are universal in form: the universal and particular 
‘themselves’, or, to use the familiar old terms, the relation of the genus to the species. 
Of course, to say that the issues surrounding these relations are different is, in good Hegelian style, to 
say that they are related. And their ways of being related reveal two temptations to the conflation I 
want to resist—and that I think Hegel resists, as a central part of his general struggle against 
subjectivism, the struggle Sedgwick herself is so tenacious in laying out. So before I go on, I want to 
sketch two such ways in which Kant’s own views in theoretical philosophy can lead us to assimilate 
(incorrectly) the universal/particular and concept/intuition distinctions. 
The first Kantian temptation: The doctrine of judgements 
The first way Kant tempts us to this assimilation is through a peculiarity of his view about 
judgement—a peculiarity that I have found my upbringing in a Fregean logical culture makes 
somewhat hard to keep in view.[2] For Kant, judgements are combinations or syntheses of general 
representations—combinations, that is, of concepts. Thus the only kinds of representations that can 
show up in a judgement directly are universals. Singular representations cannot appear in judgements 
at all, and when you see something that looks like a singular representation in a judgement—for 
instance, this body in the judgement This body is heavy—what you have espied is the singular use of 
a general or universal representation.[3] In addition to this singular use, universals in a judgement 
can have a particular use, when, e.g., a universal appears in the subject term, and the judgement 
subordinates this subject to the predicate. For instance, in the judgement All bodies are heavy, the 
subject term all bodies is particular in relation to the universalpredicate; bodies are a species of the 
genus of heavy things. 
The singular use of universals is related to their generality, in both its universal and particular forms; 
when we use a universal as a singular in the subject position of a judgement, we are using it as a 
particular at the same time (or at least, we paradigmatically do so). For example, in representing the 
subject of This body is heavythrough this body, we not only pick it out as this single thing, but pick it 
out through its membership in a species relative to the predicate-genus. Thus because in one sense a 
subject term subordinated to the predicate term is a particular with respect to it, and because in 
another sense the subject term, while general, is used to refer to a single thing, we end up with 
judgements in which something correctly identified, logically, as a particular is used to refer to what 
shows up in intuition (that is, transcendentally-psychologically) as a singular. 
Now, so far, this is all just logical doctrine, and nothing much transcendental-psychological has 
entered in. But consider this logical doctrine in relation to two of Kant’s ideas about the faculties of 
the human mind: first, his characterisation of concepts as universals and intuitions as singulars; 
second, his insistence that the activity of the understanding is always an activity of judging. In 
relation to these ideas, we can now say that what is taken up in intuition through singular 
representations is taken up in judgment through a particular concept, and the temptation will be to 
talk at the transcendental-psychological level about intuitions and particulars interchangeably—
supported by our peculiar (and recent!) English use of the word ‘particular’ to pick out particle-like 
bits. 
The second Kantian temptation: The contingency of the system of nature 
The second aspect of Kant’s theoretical philosophy that can tempt us to conflate the 
universal/particular relation with the concept/intuition relation is his conception of what a proper 
systematic knowledge of nature must look like—a conception on which Sedgwick sheds a great deal 
of light in her book. Although Kant holds that, in the case of the rational investigation of the system 
of our a priori representations, we can have a prioriknowledge of a completely determined system of 
universals and particulars—that is, an ordered totality of genus/species concepts—he also holds that 
we have no reason to expect experience to confirm such an ordered knowledge of nature. We can 
have no such reason because the objects of nature can be known by us only through the deliverances 
of sensibility—that is, through sensible intuition. And while theoretical philosophy shows usa 
priori that the objects of experience must be causally related to one another, must have spatio-
temporal structure, and must be both qualitatively and quantitatively determined, our more 
determinate knowledge of these objects (for instance, determinations about which kinds of qualities 
they have, and how those qualities are related) must be gleaned from the content of our given 
sensible intuitions. And since this content is, precisely, given—since it is a deliverance of sensibility, 
and not the product of spontaneity—the concepts through which we represent this content in our 
cognition may not arrange themselves into neat genera and species at all. 
Here the temptation to assimilate lies in the nature of Kant’s account of why, precisely, the sensible 
origin of empirical content accounts for our inability to know that nature, properly reflected upon, 
must be systematically arranged in a genus/species relation. This account involves appeal 
to intuitions and to their role in the reflective activity through which we arrive at our empirical 
concepts, all of which are, qua empirical, logically particular in relation to genus-concepts that are 
not directly instantiated in experience.[4] Thus it can look as though the singularity of intuitions, 
their non-conceptual form, rather than their having ‘content’, is the ground of the possibility that 
our particulars may totally resist hierarchical systematisation. And hence it can look as though the 
concept/intuition distinction is the real root of the problematic relation between universal and 
particular in the idea of a complete systematic science of nature. 
Resisting the temptations 
It is not hard, I think, to see the force in these temptations. But they should be resisted nonetheless. 
Just as the particulars that can be used in the subject positions of judgements to refer to singulars are 
nonetheless universal in form, so the possibility of a non-hierarchically-organised realm of particular 
concepts is not at all due to the formalsingularity of intuitions. And more generally, the 
concept/intuition distinction does not on its own give rise to the supposed difficulty with the 
universal/particular relation. After all, it is not the intuitions themselves, qua singular representations, 
that are possibly too chaotic for systematisation; it is rather the particular concepts I reflectively 
generate to represent those singulars in judgements that are possibly too chaotic. Thus the problem 
addressed by Kant in the third Critique is not just a repetition of the problem addressed in the 
Transcendental Deduction, about the synthetic ordering of singular intuitive representations, but is 
one about how to understand the possibility of a complete system in which less general, but still 
general, particular representations are subordinated underother, more general universal 
representations. Indeed, because the system in question—the system of cognitions of nature—is a 
system of judgements, singular representations have no role in it at all.[5] 
But although the singular form, along with the non-spontaneous origins, of intuitions is irrelevant to 
the systematicity issue, the content of empirical concepts, a content that makes its transcendental-
psychological debut in intuitions, is quite relevant. Its relevance stems from Kant’s logical 
conception of specific difference—the determinacy through which the species is distinguished from 
both its genus and its coordinate species. This difference must somehow be both within and without 
the genus at once—to use Kant’s own language, he insists that while the species must stand 
under the genus, it must notbe contained within the genus. For instance, ‘rational animal’ stands 
under ‘animal’, and hence rational things are subsumed under ‘animal’. But rationality, the specific 
difference, is not contained within ‘animal’; on the contrary, since there are irrational animals, 
rationality, for Kant, cannot possibly be contained in ‘animal’. But if the specific difference is not 
contained within the genus itself, it has to come from outside. This ‘externality’ of specific difference 
drives Kant’s systematicity problem with respect to empirical concepts, and persists even if the 
conceptual form of intuited content is recognised. It is therefore a logical problem that cannot be 
reduced to a transcendental-psychological one. 
Thus I want to say that Hegel’s response to Kant’s treatment of this issue is not to take away Kant’s 
source of specific difference by reforming the concept/intuition relation. It is to make such an appeal 
unnecessary, by reforming the universal/particular relation directly. Here is a sketch of how he does 
that, a sketch I propose as a possible emendation to parts of Sedgwick’s book. 
An important note from the Transcendental Deduction 
In the spirit of such an emendation, I will try to follow Sedgwick’s lead in giving a clear reading of 
what Hegel does and does not take from Kant’s presentation of his view on a given topic. I shall 
consider in some detail a passage from §16 of the Transcendental Deduction, to which I think Hegel 
paid special attention. The passage is found in a footnote to B133, and it reads as follows: 
The analytic unity of consciousness pertains to all common concepts as such, e.g., if I think of red in 
general, I thereby represent to myself a feature that (as a mark) can be encountered in anything, or 
that can be combined with other representations; therefore only by means of an antecedently 
conceived possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. A representation that 
is to be thought of as common to several must be regarded as belonging to those that in addition to it 
also have something different in themselves; consequently it must antecedently be thought in 
synthetic unity with other (even if only possible) representations, before I can think in it the analytic 
unity of consciousness that makes it into a conceptus communis. (B133n.; translation modified) 
Kant’s main move in this note is to identify and relate two kinds of unity involved in the 
representational activity of consciousness: analytic unity and synthetic unity. Kant’s view is that our 
concepts enjoy only analytic unity—or, to use the language of the Critique of Judgement, that we 
think only by means of analytic universality, while an intuitive intellect would think by means of 
synthetic universals; hence his claim here about “the analytic unity of consciousness that makes [a 
representation] into a conceptus communis“. As Sedgwick shows in ample detail, it is this merely 
analytic unity or universality that Hegel decries as “emptiness”. 
Kant’s example in this note of a universal enjoying analytic unity is a standard property universal, 
‘red’. In virtue of its analytic unity, this universal represents “a feature that […] can be encountered 
in anything, or that can be combined with other representations.” It is obviously not true that red “can 
be encountered in anything”—just think here of pure mathematical objects—but we can see what 
Kant means if we consider the other kind of unity he talks about: synthetic unity. This synthetic unity 
is not the (analytic) unity of a property universal, but the unity of a kind of thing or object—a unity in 
which multiple property-determinations are combined to jointly constitute the nature or unity of the 
thing. Thus Kant says that an analytic unity names “a feature that (as a mark) can be encountered in 
anything” because the analytic unity formally picks out a property whose logical nature is such as to 
be found contained within a synthetically unified kind universal. In such a universal the property is 
one of many, whence Kant’s claim that kinds or synthetic unities include, “in addition to” whatever 
property is picked out by means of a given analytic unity, “also something different in themselves”. 
That is, for red to be an analytic universal is for it to unify in itself multiple distinct kinds, or 
synthetic unities (that is, all the red things); but each of these must be thought of also as distinct from 
the others, and thus as being unities of multiple distinct properties beyond red. For ‘red’ to pick out, 
in the manner of analytic unity, this brick, that stop sign, and that sports car over there, those objects 
must be both red and something else, different in each case.[6] 
Note that the synthetic unities Kant is talking about must be conceived formally as kinds or as 
universals, and not as singular objects or singular representations. Because synthetic unities are 
articulated in terms of properties that themselves constitute analytic unities, and because analytic 
unities are themselves necessarily general, synthetic unities can never reach down to the infima 
species. Hence the synthetic unities Kant is talking about must be conceived formally as kinds or as 
universals, and not as distinct objects, individual things, or singular representations. Indeed, such a 
view of conceptual determinacy neither requires nor allows singularity to play a role in any strictly 
logical sense (as is fitting for a theory such as Kant’s in which there is, strictly speaking, no such 
thing as singularity of logical form). Thus no matter how thoroughly any given such synthetic unity 
or kind has been determined, it can always be determined further, without thereby losing its 
generality of form, and each such determination is in turn a determination of a species of the genus 
picked out by the previous, less-determinate version of the kind. 
Kant’s own emphasis in this footnote is on the alleged priority of synthetic unity—a unity he notably 
does not refer to as a unity “of consciousness”—over analytic unity. This priority is supposed to 
follow from their formal difference: the way ‘red’ binds together all the different red things is not the 
way each of these unites all its different properties, and the former is parasitic on the latter—behind 
any representation of analytic unity, Kant tells us, lurks a prior representation of synthetic unity, a 
prior representation of a concrete kind of thing with many properties related complexly to other 
things. But merely paying attention to Kant’s own idea that synthetic unities are unities—that is, 
are per secombinations of distinct determinations—shows that we find ourselves committed here, 
through the nature of analytic property universals (Hegel’s ‘abstract universals’), not only to their 
logical dependence on synthetic kind universals (Hegel’s ‘concrete universals’), but also to a system 
of such universals, both of the property type and the kind type. Such a system would have to consist 
of interlocking analytic and synthetic unities—properties shared across multiple kinds, and kinds 
differentiated by some, but not all, the properties they contain. And without such a system—without, 
that is, a degree of mutual interdependence of analytic and synthetic unities—we could have no 
instances of either. 
Furthermore, that system cannot be merely a mass of otherwise disordered properties and kinds. For 
we could not coherently claim that the synthetic unities brought together in a single analytic unity 
were also (as is required) differentiated without the analytic unities being further grouped into types 
of properties, such as colour, shape, material, and so on. It is through such kinds of properties that the 
determinate differences among kinds grouped under any given property are differentiated. Consider, 
for instance, the case in which the property universal ‘red’ unifies this brick, that jewelry box, and 
that lamp over there, and in which the first two also share (imagine) the same cuboid shape. But ‘red’ 
is possible only if the synthetic unities it depends upon are also different; hence the brick and the 
jewelry box must be different in a different way than each is different from the (presumably non-
cuboid) lamp. Such differences of difference make up the types of properties in question. And of 
course this situation involving types of properties also involves the idea of synthetic universals that 
share more than one property term, and their distinction from synthetic universals that share more, or 
share fewer, property terms. Thus we have a full logical array of complexly ordered, and even 
hierarchically ordered, ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ universals. And importantly, we can’t help but 
generate such a full logical array—there can be no determinacy at all without such an array of 
determinacies, including many which exhibit synthetic, rather than analytic, unity.[7] 
Now, it may seem that this is not enough to show that our concepts of natural objects will arrange 
themselves into a system of neatly ordered genera and species; after all, such a neatly ordered system 
assumes that some properties are more important than others. If I were to make a kind term more 
determinate by adding an insignificant property to its content, I might well not hit upon a species 
properly so called. And of the important properties or kinds, some may not in fact show up in nature 
in all their possible variations. For instance, there are biped mammals, and quadruped mammals, but 
no hexapod mammals (or if there are, then no octopods, or no decapods, or no dodecapods…). Yet I 
have to get out into the world to learn such things, don’t I? And isn’t this just what Kant means by 
his appeal to external content to deliver the specific difference? 
If this is what Kant means, then he is right, and Hegel agrees with him completely, despite his 
apparent protests to the contrary.[8] But Sedgwick—unless I’m reading her quite wrongly—doesn’t 
take Kant’s point this way, and doesn’t think Hegel takes it this way, either. The important Kantian 
point isn’t that we might fail to discern the right things about natural objects; it is that we might know 
all there is for us to know about all the objects of nature, and still fail to be able to arrange them in 
species and genera—not because of some logical ineptitude on our part, but because the objects and 
their properties might not be such as to be so arrangeable. 
It seems to me that the kind of reflecting I am saying Hegel does on the logical structures discussed 
in Kant’s B133 footnote eliminates such a possibility. But perhaps Hegel makes a mistake about 
those structures. After all, the unities Kant discusses there are “unities of consciousness”, and 
perhaps his point is that these unities are only unities of consciousness, and not unities of 
determinacy per se. 
It is certainly the case that Hegel takes this note—or something like this note he finds elsewhere—to 
have general significance for the idea of determinacy per se. For Hegel this passage captures a deep 
truth about what it is for something, anything, or things in general, to be one way rather than another, 
to have any kind of determinacy at all. Any determinacy, even if very abstract, as in the case of red, 
brings along with it an enormous array of other related determinacies, including the idea that red 
must be a member of a type or kind of determinacy, and that it must have members in turn. Hence if 
there is any way that anything is at all, whether it is ‘knowable’ by us or not, then there are a host of 
things and a host of ways that they are. Moreover, this host of things and host of ways forms a single, 
unified way, precisely insofar as that totality both determines and is determined by its members—in 
other words, determinacy, as articulated in this footnote, is necessarily organic and systematic. But 
for it to be organic is for it to determine its parts via the whole, and to array itself into genera and 
species. That we have to go out into the world to find out what these genera and species are, and how 
they are organised, is (largely) a separate issue. 
Conclusion: Logical form and subjective spirit 
I have tried to show how Hegel finds in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction itself the materials for his 
dialectical theory of conceptual form, and more narrowly the materials for his dialectical theory of 
the conceptual relation of universality and particularity, as it relates to the idea of a system of 
concepts. Most importantly, I have tried to show that the problem Kant identifies for a system of 
empirical concepts need not involve any difficulty with singular representations, which can’t enter 
into such a system in any case. In his published texts of the Jena period, Hegel only hints at the 
efforts he is making in this regard, but his evolving logical doctrine can be seen in his remaining 
system manuscripts, and the results can be found in the developed form he gave that doctrine in 
the Science of Logic—a doctrine which includes the kinds of points made above about the 
interdependence of abstract and concrete universals, or of properties and kinds. 
I have also tried to suggest how separate this problem is from any questions about concepts and 
intuitions, by laying out Kant’s position on synthetic and analytic unity and its implications for Hegel 
without any reference to that faculty doctrine. These two problems are related—not least in terms of 
the way that Kant wants to characterise singular representations as enjoying a kind of synthetic unity. 
And we could make observations similar to the ones I’ve made here about, say, Hegel’s treatment of 
the relation of general determinations to singular determinations, both in the Phenomenologyand in 
the Logic, where he talks about the incoherence of self-sufficient singulars, and in the Philosophy of 
Spirit, where he offers his own model of intuition and concept-formation. But in these treatments of 
the relation of the singular to the general, Hegel presupposes that the general comes articulated into a 
system of genera and species. In the Phenomenology, this ‘presupposition’ comes in the idea that 
every episode of sense-certainty is an instance of sense-certainty, and in the subsequent discussions 
of perception and understanding, as well as the idea of self-consciousness as life. In thePhilosophy of 
Spirit, this presupposition comes in the form of the conception of the intuitive field and the objects 
within it as always implicitly interconnected in determinately rich ways. Hence both the epistemic 
model of the Phenomenology and the psychological model of the Encyclopedia rely heavily on this 
presupposition, delivered by the Subjective Logic. 
We cannot see this reliance if we do not distinguish, from Hegel’s earliest Jena writings, between the 
criticism of Kant’s universal/particular relation and that of his concept/intuition relation. I have not, 
of course, offered any details here as to the precise implications making this distinction sharply 
would have for the argument of Sedgwick’s book. The short answer is that it would require that 
Hegel’s appeals to history, embodiedness, culture, and contingency be seen as responses to his 
logical discovery that we cannot but be saddled with an immense interlocking set of concepts, 
including substantive commitments to the kinds of synthetic unities that make up the constituents of 
reality, and the properties unified in those unities. This discovery is, perhaps, just another instance of 
Hegel’s generally low estimate of our powers of abstraction, so clearly and consistently brought out 
in Sedgwick’s book. And although I have dedicated my comments to articulating this distinction in a 
way in which I think Sedgwick overlooks, I cannot close without saying that it is one I would not 
have seen if it were not for her book. Which is just to say, that even if it’s true that it is overlooked, it 
is nonetheless also made visible, by Sedgwick’s penetrating, patient, and generous book. 
This essay is a revised version of my original comments on Sally Sedgwick’s book, given at a panel 
hosted by the Chicago-Area Consortium in German Philosophy in November, 2013. My revisions are 
intended to clarify the expression of the claims I made that afternoon; I’ve made little attempt to 
eliminate the traces of the informal, discussion-oriented context in which they were made—for 
instance, I’ve left in a number of sweeping claims and I’ve provided little in the way of references. 
I’ve made no attempt to reflect Sally’s response, the comments presented by Bill Bristow (our co-
panelist), or the Q&A and discussion afterward. I am grateful to Sally Sedgwick for her outstanding 
book, to Bill Bristow for his contribution, to the Institute for the Humanities at the University of 
Illinois-Chicago for hosting us, and to Rachel Zuckert and the Consortium for organizing what was 




[1] An electronic search of Kant’s and Hegel’s writings turns up no such phrase as “sinnliche 
Besondere” or “sinnliche Besonderheit” in either author, with the exception of a few such phrases in 
the posthumous editorial compilations of student lecture notes on Hegel’s aesthetics. Sedgwick slips 
into this usage precisely when trying to relate the issues about universals and particulars in the 
third Critique to issues of concepts and intuitions from the first Critique (see, e.g., p. 22 and p. 22n.). 
It is to be found, however, here and there in the secondary literature. Sedgwick attributes something 
like it to Allison (p. 20n12), and in passages from Guyer she cites, he uses “particular object” and 
“particulars” in a way that strongly suggests the “particle” usage (p. 19n11). There, she understands 
the intuitive intellect’s capacity to generate particulars as equivalent to a capacity to 
generate intuitions, that is, singular representations. If I am right, these capacities are not the same 
(though they may well both be enjoyed by an intuitive intellect on Kant’s view). Kant himself does 
use closely related phrases, such as “particular object”, “particular perception” etc., but they occur 
very infrequently (once or twice each in the first Critique, for instance) and are not used to articulate 
the major points in question. The most widely-used Hegel translations in English use such phrases 
constantly and in deeply misleading ways, as do a number of translations of (Hegelian moments in) 
Kierkegaard (for instance those of Hannay). 
[2] Longuenesse’s Kant (in Kant and the Capacity to Judge, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998) is much 
closer to Frege; see also Paul Redding’s 2013 Pacific APA paper (availablehere) for more on these 
lines. 
[3] See both the Jäsche Logic and the discussion of singular judgements in the firstCritique. Kant 
endorses the same view in both, namely, the view that there are singular judgements, and that the 
subject term in singular judgements is a universal with only one object standing under it. What he 
objects to in the first Critique is the further claim that singular and universal judgements have the 
same form in virtue of this fact about their subject terms. In other words, Kant claims that the 
difference in the use of a formally identical general representation (as subject-term) within these two 
kinds of judgement is enough to give the judgements themselves distinct forms. 
[4] See, e.g., the first Critique’s discussion of pure air, pure earth etc. 
[5] It’s not clear to what extent particular representations used singularly can appear in such a 
system, either. Would it include statements about, e.g., the Earth, or Mercury? Or only general laws? 
[6] So, we might specify the analytic unity ‘red’ by listing the red things: {Object1, Object2, Object3, 
…}, and then specify each of those as a synthetic unity, e.g. Object1: {Red, Round, Metal}, Object2: 
{Red, Round, Wood}, Object3: {Red, Square, Metal}, etc. If there are not (possibly) multiple objects 
under ‘red’, then it cannot be a conceptus communis. But for those objects to be distinct is for them to 
exhibit, beyond the property of being red, some other properties, which must themselves be sufficient 
to make those objects distinct from one another. Yet since there is no infima species, 
each ObjectN unity is, while synthetic, inherently general, or is the unity not of a single thing but of a 
kind. It must (possibly) have not only individuals under it, but further more specific kinds (that is, 
species); For I can always add another determination. Furthermore, the analytic unity of ‘red’ is 
possible only through the synthetic generality of ObjectN. But that synthetic generality is a kind, and 
is possible only through the distinction among properties (its and others’) into kinds of properties. 
That distinction in turn allows for genus/species arrangement, along the axes of such kinds-of-
properties that are variable for the kind of object it is (e.g., objects can be distinguished by colour, 
shape, material) and along the more-and-less determinate kinds themselves. For Hegel, the question 
of how to conceive of the interrelation of property kinds (abstract universals) and object kinds 
(concrete universals) is the task of, first, the Objective Logic and, second, the Realphilosophie. But 
the proof that it can be done is the Subjective Logic. 
[7] But what about the wholly normal way in which kind terms—especially since Frege—tend to be 
treated as analytic unities, or as defined extensionally? It seems to me probably Kantian, and 
definitely Hegelian, to say that in these cases we have an analyticuse of a synthetic unity. 
[8] One of Hegel’s favourite remarks to make about nature and the natural order is that there is 
nothing rational about there being precisely 63 species of parrot; the number is better understood as 
the expression of nature’s ‘impotence’ than of any kind of rationality. 
♕ 
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